When Cheatham read Hood’s book he was appalled. Clearly Hood was trying to pin the blame for Spring Hill squarely on Cheatham’s shoulders and Cheatham would have none of it. He almost immediately began writing a response to Hood’s accusation and in late 1881 had the opportunity to read his paper to the Louisville Southern Historical Society. Cheatham’s composition was subsequently published in the Southern Historical Society Papers. His recollection of the late afternoon conference at the Thompson residence is as follows:

When I had returned from my left, where I had been to get Bate in position, and was on the way to the right of my line, it was dark; but I intended to move forward with Cleburne and Brown and make the attack, knowing that Bate would be in position to support them. Stewart’s column had already passed by on the way toward the turnpike, and I presumed he would be in position on my right.

xOn reaching the road where General Hood’s field headquarters had been established, I found a courier with a message from General Hood, requesting me to come to him at Captain Thompson’s house, about one and a fourth miles back on the road to Rutherford’s creek. I found General Stewart with General Hood. The Commanding General there informed me that he had concluded to wait till morning, and directed me to hold my command in readiness to attack at daylight.

I was never more astonished than when General Hood informed me that he had concluded to postpone the attack till daylight. The road was still open - orders to remain quiet until morning - and nothing to prevent the enemy from marching to Franklin. 

Furthermore Cheatham stated:

The dramatic scene with which he embellishes his narrative of the day’s operations only occurred in the imagination of General Hood.

It is only reasonable to believe that by nightfall on the 29th Hood was upset, as not only he remembered but Stewart also. Whether he launched into Cheatham as previously described will never be known but it is hard to believe by this stage that Hood would simply give up the initiative without reason and tell Cheatham to wait until the morning. One of Hood’s staff officers, in a statement not often referenced by writers and scholars, provided a tantalizing clue as to what might really have happened. Major Joseph Cummings wrote:

General Hood sent me forward with an order to General Cheatham to attack at once. I delivered the order, and as I had ridden hard to deliver it I returned to Gen. Hood’s headquarters at a slow pace expecting every minute to hear the sound of the attack on the pike. It was now getting dark. It was the 29th of November, chilly and drizzling. When I reached Gen. Hood’s headquarters, to my astonishment I found Gen. Cheatham there, he having out-ridden me by a different route. He was remonstrating with Gen. Hood against a night attack. 

Cummings’ paper, written for his family’s enjoyment and not as any sort of official history, does great damage to Cheatham if accurate. It effectively refutes Cheatham’s claim that it was Hood who was the driving force behind abandoning the offensive. On what Hood’s response was to Cheatham’s plea to call off the attack Cummings is silent. Perhaps he was witness only to some of the exchange although it seems from the facts available that Hood was not yet ready to call it quits and instead sent a staff officer galloping after Stewart. As for Cummings some might say that as an officer on Hood’s staff he would naturally choose to back his chief’s story but in describing Hood as “physically handicapped, if not wholly disqualified from active service in the field” Cummings comes across as far from partisan. 

In the midst of this terse Hood and Cheatham meeting John Pirtle, the staff member General Bate had sent to confirm Cheatham’s earlier order which had halted the movement on the Columbia Turnpike, finally arrived at Oaklawn not long before 7 p.m. Pirtle did not get what could be termed a warm reception. It would seem Cheatham was in a foul mood because in the yard outside the Thompson mansion Cheatham told him, with Hood present, that Bate could either pull back as ordered and connect with Cleburne or he could “report under arrest” directly to General Hood. Why Hood, who had personally ordered Bate’s movement toward the pike, did not interject is unknown although perhaps he did not hear this exchange. With a quick salute Pirtle remounted his horse. Message in tow the major raced back through the darkness and delivered the “peremptory order.” Bate, probably still doubting the logic of the entire situation, pulled his men away from the turnpike and began the difficult process of locating Cleburne’s left flank in the black of night. Much work remained as almost a full mile separated their positions. For William Bate the night was far from over.

Upon arriving in Spring Hill John Schofield established his headquarters at the home of William McCissack and began an immediate assessment of the strategic situation. Frankly things did not look good. It was quite obvious that a good portion of Hood’s army was in close proximity to the Columbia Turnpike as evidenced by the countless campfires already burning and others springing up almost as far as the eye could see. Schofield knew all too well that many of his troops were still strung out along the pike to the south. Additionally, as if anxiety was not enough to deal with the late autumn night had turned cold and blustery. Still, Schofield acted responsibly and upon learning that enemy cavalry had been lurking about Thompson’s Station several miles north of Spring Hill he moved to clear a path to Franklin if necessary.

As the fates of war unfolded at Spring Hill the action at Columbia was fast approaching a conclusion. Although the Confederates had managed to lay a pontoon bridge across the Duck River the main body had delayed in making a determined effort to cross. Taking full advantage of his opponent’s delay General Jacob Cox began pulling the remaining Union troops out of their entrenchments as ordered earlier in the day by General Schofield. Under cover of night Cox fortified the picket line, instructing the

Jacob Dolson Cox

12th and 16th Kentucky regiments to serve as support for the pickets. Next Cox got General James Reilly’s division moving toward Spring Hill. A captain remembered how the “rearguards were ordered positively to use the bayonet on fence-corner stragglers, and the orders were in several instances obeyed.” 

With Reilly’s three brigades on their way by about 7:30 p.m. Cox prepared to withdraw the final division - that of General Thomas Wood. Checking his watch regularly Cox hoped to have Wood en route to Spring Hill by about 10 p.m. If all went well he knew Wood’s men should be out of Columbia and over Rutherford Creek by well before midnight. If that could be accomplished Cox thought General Kimball’s division, which had been holding a line along Rutherford Creek since early in the day, would fall in line behind Wood and the entire Union force would in the vicinity of Spring Hill or north of it by probably 3 or 4 a.m. What Cox did not yet know was how events were developing in and around Spring Hill.

Following his brief stop in Spring Hill and conversations with a handful of officers General Schofield pushed ahead toward Thompson’s Station around 9 p.m. Clearly the report of enemy cavalry at Thompson’s was on his mind. That news had come from a railroad engineer who had encountered some of Forrest’s horsemen, those of Lawrence Ross’ Texas brigade, and while the engineer had barely escaped he said the Rebels had set fire to the railroad depot and a nearby bridge. In his own words, written one month after Spring Hill, Schofield aptly described this hectic portion of the evening:

...I pushed on with General Ruger’s division to clear the road at Thompson’s Station, which had been occupied by a large body of the enemy’s cavalry at dark that evening. On our arrival at Thompson’s the enemy had disappeared, his camp-fires still burning, and General Ruger took possession of the cross-roads without opposition. 

Schofield next ordered several members of his headquarters staff, headed up by chief engineer Captain William J. Twining, to ride at a full gallop up the turnpike and not stop until they reached Franklin. Once there Schofield told Twining to immediately telegraph General Thomas and give him the latest information. Twining and his small band of comrades quickly rode off into the darkness and Schofield listened for several minutes until the sounds of hoofs could no longer be heard, replaced by the dull whistle of the cold north wind. Comfortable that at the very least the immediate road to Franklin was open Schofield turned his horse south and headed back toward Spring Hill.

Meanwhile A. P. Stewart was leading his 8,000-man corps northward along the Davis Ford Road with assistance from the guide Hood had appointed. In a letter written to J. P. Young in April 1895 Stewart provided a great amount of detail as to how things transpired along the Davis Ford Road and subsequently the Old Settlers’ Road. Once again Stewart sticks resolutely to his story for the letter to Young is practically the same version as the one he submitted as his official report to Confederate authorities exactly thirty years earlier. The letter to Young, in part, reads as follows:

I rode somewhat in advance of the troops, having the guide with me. At a place where the road on which we were moving appeared to curve to the left - now some time after dark - there was a high gate on the right-hand side of the road. The guide said there used to be a road turning off from the one on which we were moving, through that gate, which was the road we wished to find. I inquired if it would take us to the pike beyond Spring Hill. He said it would, about a mile beyond, near the tollgate. ‘Then,’ said I, ‘that is the road we want.’ We rode through the gateway, the head of the column following, and soon passed a house on our left, where someone informed me General Forrest was. I dismounted and went into the house to get such information as Forrest could give me. He said the enemy had left the direct road from Spring Hill to Franklin and taken the Carter’s Creek Pike. I think it was just as I was mounting my horse to go on with the guide that the staff officer (whom I did not know) came up and said we were going wrong - on the wrong road - and that General Hood had sent him to show me my position. I inquired when he saw General Hood, and said that, according to the instructions I had received, we were going exactly right. He said he had just come from General Hood. After some further parleying, I concluded (in view of the fact, as General Forrest informed me, that the enemy had abandoned the direct road and taken the Carter’s Creek Pike) that General Hood had changed his mind after I left him as to what he wished me to do. So we turned back with this officer to the road we had left and followed it toward Spring Hill (as I supposed) until we came to the line of troops crossing the road, and here I saw General Brown. I was then informed that I was to march on and form on the right and in extension of Cheatham’s troops. This was so directly the reverse of what Hood himself had told me he wished - ‘Put your right across the road beyond Spring Hill, your left extending down this way’ (where I saw him soon after crossing the creek); ‘I do not wish you to march your whole corps up to the right; it is too far for the men’ - that I felt sure a mistake had been made. So I said to my staff officers: ‘Bivouac the men here and I will go to see General Hood and find out what he wishes us to do.’

General Edward C. Walthall, one of Stewart’s divisional commanders, recalled that it was “10 or 11 o’clock” before the men were ordered into bivouac. Most had been in formation for some six hours in addition to the forced morning and afternoon march from Columbia and on top of sheer physical exhaustion they were cold and hungry. Scores of Confederates fell asleep almost immediately but those who remained awake, smoking, brewing coffee, and talking, might have been able to faintly hear the sound of marching feet and clattering accouterments barely a half mile to the west.

With Stewart having left his men behind to search out some much-needed answers it becomes necessary to relate what had been transpiring on the Confederate right while Old Straight’s corps was tramping up the Davis Ford Road.

Much of the Spring Hill legend began here - on the Confederate right flank where confusion and inaction reigned in spades. At the center of the action, or lack thereof, was General John Calvin Brown. With his remaining troops (those of General Gist) now on the field and in line Brown was ready to advance his division. Yet there was to be no advance because as Brown would later claim, “I received no further orders that evening or during the night to advance or change my position.” Brown also spoke to several officers about his lack of attack orders on the night of November 29th and so if anything his story is consistent. In a letter written to J. P. Young by General James Chalmers long after the war the cavalry commander related how he had encountered Brown late in the day and asked why he was not assaulting the Yankee position. Chalmers said that Brown “very curtly” replied, “I have no orders.” Chalmers was a bit miffed by Brown’s tone and replied in turn, “General, when I was circumstanced as you are at Shiloh, I attacked without orders.” Brown then said, “I would prefer to wait for orders.” Captain James Dinkins, who it seems rode up with Chalmers, was within earshot of this conversation and independently confirmed the same basic facts. Chalmers meanwhile, seeing that Brown could not be moved, rode off into the night.

Brown was also visited by a pair of staff officers from General John C. Carter’s brigade, one of the four forming Brown’s division. The officers, Captain H. M. Neely and Major John Ingram, rode along Brown’s line and first ran into General Carter whom they asked why there was no attack being made. Carter, whom they found sitting beneath a tree, had as much information as they did - none. Riding “a little farther to the rear” Neely and Ingram met Brown and asked him the same question. Brown pointedly said, “I don’t know; I have no orders.” Neely then said to Brown that “if he would take the responsibility of beginning the attack without orders he could safely count on a ‘new feather in his cap,’ as it would be a quick and easy matter to capture or destroy Schofield’s Corps in its present condition.” Again Brown responded in the negative - “No, I must wait for orders.” This apparently set off Major Ingram, who had been drinking. In his disgust Ingram said sarcastically to Brown, “General, if you will give me your escort company, I will drive that regiment away.” Brown, in no mood for such blatant disrespect, snapped at Ingram and told him that he was under arrest.

The frustration over the stalled attack was not limited to just a few. It seems rather to have been quite widespread. Colonel Ellison Capers, who commanded the 24th South Carolina regiment in General Gist’s brigade, wrote that the troops “were in momentary expectation of moving” and “could not understand why we did not attack, and every man felt and I heard hundreds remark that for some cause we were losing a grand opportunity.” Capers went on to say that he and Gist, joined by perhaps Strahl, rode out on the right where they could hear the Federals “pulling down fences and tearing off plank from houses” as they tried to fortify their lines. These officers could also distinctly hear the enemy horses and wagons moving about. Capers grew so frustrated that he drew his revolver and emptied it “at the sound of voices in our front.” A little over a month later Capers wrote, “This state of affairs was, and still is, inexplicable to me, and gave us a great disappointment.

States Rights Gist had a name that embodied for much of the South exactly what the Civil War was truly about. General Gist was born in South Carolina in 1831 and it is not hard to imagine how his father Nathaniel felt about the sovereign rights of the states given how his seventh son was named. Young States attended Harvard University Law School and became a successful practicing attorney as well a member of the South Carolina militia. The onset of war saw Gist serving first in his home state and then in Mississippi during the Vicksburg Campaign. He was thereafter reassigned to the Army of Tennessee and served faithfully and admirably through the end of 1863 and into 1864. Gist saw action at all of the major battles and was seriously wounded in the hand on the 22nd of July during the battle for Atlanta. Gist recovered after a short time and returned to duty following the Federal occupation of the Gate City. As

States Rights Gist

commander of a brigade in John Brown’s division, however, there seems to have been some minor controversy. Gist’s date of rank as a brigadier general dated that of General Brown, who had been promoted to major general as of August 4, 1864. Gist on the other hand had no promotion in the works despite his solid record and apparently there was talk that as a South Carolinian he had been bypassed for the Tennessean Brown. Some also felt that the same thing had occurred in February 1864 when William Bate, another Tennessean, had been promoted ahead of Gist. Additionally, there is evidence that by the end of 1864 Gist may well have been readying for the journey home to South Carolina as both Generals Beauregard and Hardee were pulling strings behind the scenes to accomplish just that. Unfortunately for the young general he could not get his transfer until the Tennessee Campaign was concluded.

With the entire Confederate offensive now having ground to a complete halt General William Bate at long last completed the trying task of connecting his division’s right flank with Patrick Cleburne’s left. Bate and his men had stumbled “with delay and difficulty” through the darkness over unfamiliar ground for almost three hours before finding their new position at almost 10 p.m. Additionally Bate reported to Cheatham that his left flank was still vulnerable to an enemy attack and requested “force to protect it.” As a precautionary measure Bate refused his left “to confront any movement from that direction” and shortly thereafter Cheatham directed Johnson’s division of Lee’s corps, which had remained alone near Rutherford Creek following A. P. Stewart’s departure, to move up and form on Bate’s exposed flank. Bate, however, was still utterly convinced that pulling his men away from the turnpike was folly and so after posting skirmishers and pickets he, “accompanied by a staff officer and one or more couriers,” rode to Hood’s headquarters.

As Bate began his trek Captain William Twining of Schofield’s staff was finishing his. Galloping hard into Franklin, with his horse on the verge of breaking down, Twining immediately made his way to the telegraph station. Once there he compiled a brief dispatch for General Thomas in Nashville and sent it on its way:

Major-General Schofield directs me to inform you that the enemy’s cavalry crossed Duck River in force at daylight this morning at Huey’s Mill, six miles from Columbia, and pushed at once for Spring Hill. Their cavalry reached that point at 4 p.m., and their infantry came in before dark and attacked General Stanley, who held the place with one division, very heavily. General Schofield’s troops are pushing for Franklin as rapidly as possible. The general says he will not be able to get father than Thompson’s Station to-night, and possibly not farther than Spring Hill. He regards his situation as extremely perilous, and fears that he may be forced into a general battle to-morrow or lose his wagon train. General Wilson’s cavalry have been pushed off toward the east, and do not connect with our infantry nor cover the pike. Thinking that the troops under General A. J. Smith had reached Nashville, General Schofield directed me to have them pushed down the Franklin pike to Spring Hill by daylight to-morrow. I left General Schofield two hours ago at Thompson’s Station.

At Oaklawn there was much activity. Following Hood’s final meeting with Frank Cheatham a large dinner was served by the gracious Thompson family. After dessert and perhaps cigars for the gentlemen everyone began to relax for the evening. By 9 p.m. or shortly thereafter Hood, along with Governor Harris and Major A. P. Mason, had retired to the same comfortable room. Numerous authors have at this point in the story related how Hood might have or perhaps did consume either laudanum or some other pain-killing drug to numb the assumed pain in the stump of his leg following such a long day in the saddle. There is absolutely no evidence of Hood arbitrarily taking any sort of drugs on November 29th or any other day for that matter. Surely Hood, like the thousands of other Civil War amputees, was administered pain-killing medication in the days and perhaps even weeks following the loss of his leg. However, it is quite a leap to postulate that fourteen months later Hood would still be using drugs to deal with either real physical pain or psychological trauma. One must also keep in mind that Hood's recovery from his surgery was from all accounts exceptional and there is nothing pointing to any sort of setback or delay. In fact there is scant evidence that Hood’s leg, or what remained of it, was causing him any serious difficulty as 1864 wound to a close. He was surely tired, probably sore, and he may have even been in a surly mood but not a single person who was with him on November 29th mentioned anything that lends credence to some of the claims that have been practically accepted as fact. Stories have also cropped up about drinking and outright drunkenness at Oaklawn among generals aside from Hood but most of these, including the only one directly traceable to a source, seem to be more legend than anything else. Whatever did go on, if anything, will never be known. What seems most likely is that Hood and his staff simply went to sleep.

At 11 o’clock everyone’s slumber was broken by several hard knocks on the bedroom door. General Alexander Stewart had arrived. Stewart, in the company of General Forrest and the staff officer who had earlier tracked him down, had made his way through the frosty night air to Oaklawn hoping for some clarification from Hood. What he was told was shocking.

After waking his commander and giving him a few moments to prepare himself Stewart asked Hood if “he had sent this officer of General Cheatham’s staff to place me in position.” Hood replied that he had indeed sent the officer whereupon Stewart asked if Hood had changed his mind regarding the ultimate objective of cutting the turnpike north of Spring Hill. To this Hood answered that his goal was still the same but Cheatham had asked for support on Brown’s right flank. Stewart went on to say, “I explained to him that in the uncertainty I was in I had directed the troops, who had been marching rapidly since daylight, and it was now 11 p.m., to be placed in bivouac, and had come to report. He remarked, in substance, that it was not material; to let the men rest; and directed me to move before daylight in the morning, taking the advance toward Franklin.” From this one is led to believe that Hood, after pressing all day for decisive action, quite simply gave up the offensive. There may have been a bit more to this, however, than Stewart said. Governor Harris remembered that there was some obvious tension between Hood and Stewart. Hood had asked Stewart if he could not at the very least throw a brigade across the pike. When Old Straight mentioned that his men were tired and had been on the move all day Hood, according to Harris, cut Stewart off and turned to Forrest to ask for his assistance. Hood wanted to know if Forrest and his cavalry would be able to effectively block the pike. Forrest was not optimistic. He told Hood that Buford and Chalmers were out of ammunition and only General Jackson’s division, which had managed to capture some cartridges earlier in the day, might be able to offer some assistance. Harris said that Hood told Stewart to provide Forrest with ammunition. Forrest then left after saying he “would do the best he could in the emergency.”

Hood’s next visitor was William Bate, who followed immediately on Forrest’s heels. Bate’s recollection is best told by the general himself:

On my arrival at his quarters I found General Hood in conference with General Forrest, consequently I waited some time for an interview. I informed the General of having, about dark, come near to, in line of battle, and commanded, with my skirmish line, the turnpike south of Spring Hill, and caused a cessation in the movements of wagons, horsemen, etc., which were passing; but I did not ‘pass on to the turnpike and sweep toward Columbia’ as you (General Hood) had directed me to do, because just at that time I received an order from my corps commander, General Cheatham, to halt and align the right of my division with the left of Cleburne’s, which I declined to do until I received a second order to the same effect, and then I did so. General Hood replied in substance: ‘It makes no difference now, or it is all right anyhow, for General Forrest, as you see, has just left and informed me that he holds the turnpike with a portion of his forces north of Spring Hill, and will stop the enemy if he tries to press toward Franklin, and so in the morning we will have a surrender without a fight.’ He further said, in a congratulatory manner: ‘We can sleep quiet tonight.’ I said to the General I was glad to hear what he told me, and immediately left.

These conversations are truly astounding when given even slight evaluation. Hood must have or should have clearly understood that Stewart had not secured possession of the Columbia Turnpike. Yet he did nothing to force the issue. Forrest then said that he and his forces could do little if anything to achieve the same but when talking to Bate only minutes later Hood spoke as if Forrest had practically given him a guarantee. One is left to wonder what Hood could possibly have been thinking, especially as he spoke with Bate. Additionally, why Hood never wrote of these late night meetings in either his official report or memoirs is disturbing. As one Hood author wrote the general “obviously felt that all was not lost, and in so thinking he made a tragic mistake.” The error was one that would dog John Bell Hood long after his death.

Shortly after 11 p.m. the lead units of Jacob Cox’s column began filling the Columbia Turnpike south of Spring Hill. What they saw as they moved north was both breathtaking and terrifying, something that would remain etched deep in their minds long after the war was over. As far to the right, or east, as most could see there was an endless array of campfires flickering in the cold darkness. To both veteran and new recruit alike this imposing sight meant but one thing - the Rebels were present in great force and they could well attack without a moment’s notice. Private Tillman Stevens, a member of Colonel John Casement’s four regiment brigade, wrote a vivid description of the march:

We passed through Spring Hill just before midnight. Just before coming into this town we came within plain view of Hood’s army as they were in bivouac to our right, not more than half a mile. They had thousands of fires burning brightly, and we could see the soldiers standing or moving around the fires. It was a rare and grand spectacle to behold. We were.....passing right through Hood’s army. The view was grand, the feeling intense; but we kept to the middle of the road, and hustled along toward Franklin.

Levi Scofield, an engineer officer on Cox’s staff, recalled that a colonel put his index finger to his lips and told everyone “not to speak above a whisper, and pointed to the camp-fires on the rolling slopes within sight of the road.” Scofield also remembered he could “plainly see.....the soldiers standing and moving about” and that “in the quiet of the night could hear their voices.” W. W. Gist, a fifteen year old private in the 26th Ohio, could “see the Confederates walking around their camp fires, and they seemed hardly more than half a mile away.” John Shellenberger said that he “could see the glow on the sky made by the...bivouac fires of the enemy” and remembered that the “excessive physical fatigue combined with the intense mental strain” made the night “the most trying in more than three years of soldiering.” General Stanley said the march was like "treading upon the thin crust of a smoldering volcano" and that the Confederates could have poured "destruction into the flank of our retreating column." From the Rebel viewpoint Captain P. H. Coleman of the 1st Florida, a regiment in Bate’s division, said he heard “the conversation of the troops moving on the highway” as he monitored a section of the picket line.  Coleman was not alone. General Patrick Cleburne could also hear the Federals and he sent a courier to Hood with a pointed message: “The enemy is passing in my front.” There was to be no response. 

By around 11:30 p.m. General Cox had maneuvered all three of his brigades into Spring Hill and soon thereafter John Schofield returned from his foray to Thompson’s Station. Cox’s men were utterly dead tired and dozens if not hundreds had quite literally fallen out of column from exhaustion. Schofield, however, insisted they keep moving. He and Cox spoke for a short time at General Stanley’s headquarters before Schofield ordered Cox to take the advance of the army and march immediately for Franklin. The men, many of whom had already fallen asleep, were forced back into formation by their equally exhausted officers and just after midnight, as Schofield turned to his next responsibility, Cox marched his ragged column out of Spring Hill.

Barely had Cox’s men left before the troops of Thomas Wood’s division began filing into Spring Hill. John Schofield and David Stanley meanwhile were engaged in a serious and animated debate. In addition to the thousands of troops strung out along the Columbia Turnpike the issue of the immense wagon train required full and immediate attention. Concerned that there was not enough time to move all 800 wagons out of town Schofield suggested they be burned. Stanley would have none of that and said he was determined “to make an effort to save the train.”  Followed this impassioned argument Schofield conceded as much and Stanley went to work. After seeing Stanley off Schofield mounted his horse and, accompanied by a small staff, began the twelve mile ride to Franklin.

At 1 a.m. the sounds of creaking wagon wheels and teams of straining horses could be heard all through Spring Hill. The Federal supply train was on the move and as it rolled out of town the troops from Wood’s command followed close behind. Immediately outside of the village all Federal wagon traffic was forced to cross a solitary bridge in single file fashion. The troops themselves could barely move across two or three abreast. At Thompson’s Station the convoy of men and material was joined by General Ruger’s troops and soon there were “men marching by the side of the wagons” and “in rear of the trains.” Meanwhile the remaining two brigades of General Kimball’s division, after having passed “within 300 yards” of the enemy lines, tramped into Spring Hill around 1:30 a.m.

John Bell Hood

Whitaker’s brigade withdrew from its position along the pike at this juncture and rejoined the rest of the division and soon Kimball was also clear of Spring Hill and on his way to Franklin.

Some time after midnight General Hood received his final visitor of the night. A private soldier, who apparently had fallen behind the main body because he was barefoot, somehow found his way to the Thompson mansion and was escorted to Hood’s room. There he informed Hood that upon approaching Spring Hill it was apparent the Yankees “were in great confusion” and the turnpike was choked with wagons, gun carriages, and troops. Hood responded by telling Colonel Mason to prepare an order for General Cheatham to attack the enemy moving along the pike with at least one regiment. He also instructed Mason to have the private taken to Cheatham so he could tell his story to the general directly. Hood then laid back down and for the third time fell fast asleep.

As if things were not already puzzling enough they quickly even grew more bizarre. Cheatham said he received Hood’s order via Mason “to fire upon straggling troops passing along the pike in front of my left” and that he immediately dispatched Major Bostick to find General Johnson and tell him to “take a brigade, or, if necessary, his whole division, and go on to the pike and cut off anything that might be passing.” Cheatham also said that Bostick later told him Johnson complained bitterly about being “loaned out” and he wanted to know why Cheatham had not ordered one of his own divisions to perform the task. The 48-year old Johnson, who had fought with Stonewall Jackson in the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign and for Robert E. Lee during the Army of Northern Virginia’s 1863-64 battles, could be contentious on even his best days and after having said his piece to Bostick he finally mounted his horse. Johnson then instructed several subordinates to ready the division and he and Bostick rode toward the turnpike.

Colonel W. H. Sims, a sharpshooter commander in Johnson’s division, wrote of the late night activities:

My command did not reach the encampment near Spring Hill till ten o’clock at night. On my arrival I saw the twinkling camp fires of our army reaching northward far up the pike, stretching, as I was then told, about four miles. Our place of bivouac being assigned to us, my command broke ranks and, being very tired, hastily sought their blankets for sleep. I had wrapped myself in my horse blanket, and was sinking into a much-needed slumber when I was aroused by the adjutant of our brigade with an order from General Sharp to get my troops immediately under arms, that our division (Johnson’s) had orders to move perpendicularly upon the pike, and that General Cheatham had orders to sweep down the pike at right angles to us. Our division was soon under arms in line of battle and the guns loaded. We waited hour after hour for the order to come to charge the enemy, who we understood were retreating along the pike four hundred yards in front of us toward Franklin.

As Johnson and Bostick approached the Columbia Turnpike they were met by an uneasy silence. The Federals it seemed had vanished. What neither man could have realized was at that moment they had just missed the trailing elements of Nathan Kimball’s division. The only Union troops remaining south of Spring Hill by this time were the pickets General Cox had left at Columbia and they had barely taken up the march northward. Johnson and Bostick remained near the pike for a short time and listened for any enemy activity but heard nothing. The two then turned back and around 2 a.m. reported to Cheatham at his headquarters that “they found everything quiet and no one passing.” Word was eventually sent back to Johnson’s men that there was to be no advance and the troops “sunk to sleep on the ground where they stood.” 

The catch to all of this is that Colonel Mason on the morning of November 30th, as the Rebel army marched toward Franklin,

Fields south of Spring Hill - General Ed Johnson's position east of the Columbia Turnpike

admitted to Governor Harris he had been so exhausted on the previous night that the order called for by General Hood was never sent to Cheatham. Where then did Cheatham get the idea to move on the pike if he did not receive the order? Mason obviously did not send it because he said as much yet perhaps the answer to the question is simpler than many historians have previously thought. The barefoot private who went to Hood’s room surely was escorted there by some member of the commanding general’s staff. In addition Harris, as mentioned previously, said that Hood told Mason not only to issue an attack order but to have the private sent to Cheatham “to tell his story.” One must assume that the private was not expected to find his way alone but that someone was to accompany him. As for Cheatham he said the order he received from headquarters was hand-delivered by courier. It is not altogether implausible that the same person who took the private to Hood’s room simply heard what Hood told Mason, perhaps even saw Mason go back to sleep, and was the same individual who delivered the message to Cheatham. Whether the unnamed private actually made the trip from Oaklawn to Cheatham’s tent is incidental although he may have gone along as Hood requested if for nothing else other than to add veracity to the situation. While this may sound far-fetched it cannot be discounted because someone undoubtedly gave Cheatham an order to move on the pike.

In his official report General Hood wrote with great feeling about this brief chain of events:

About 12 p.m., ascertaining that the enemy was moving in great confusion, artillery, wagons, and troops intermixed, I sent instructions to General Cheatham to advance a heavy line of skirmishers against him and still further impede and confuse his march. This was not accomplished. The enemy continued to move along the road in hurry and confusion, within hearing nearly all night. Thus was lost a great opportunity of striking the enemy for which we had labored so long - the greatest this campaign had offered, and one of the greatest of the war.

A Hood biographer almost one hundred years later wrote in conclusion:

Certainly the situation that night called for a personal investigation by Hood to see that orders were being carried out, but it was not made. It is entirely possible that the state of his health made him loathe to leave the warmth of his bed. He had been ill with rheumatism at Florence, and nearly two weeks in the saddle in cold, wet weather had done nothing to help it. Too, it was generally known that long hours in the saddle irritated the stump of his leg and caused him great discomfort. But his health probably was not the only reason. Hood always left too much to his subordinates without giving them adequate supervision.

As he had promised the commanding general Nathan Bedford Forrest did what he could to block the road north of Spring Hill. When Forrest arrived back at his headquarters at the Caldwell house he met with General Jackson and the two agreed that Lawrence Ross’ Texas brigade was the only force available for the job. General Ross’ command, numbering just shy of 700, moved out after midnight and around two o’clock reined up east of the turnpike north of Thompson’s Station and near the Fitzgerald farm. Ross was well aware that the pike was choked with men and wagons, as much by sound as by sight, and he quickly ordered three of his regiments to dismount while instructing the 9th Texas to guard the brigade’s horses. The attacking force meanwhile slipped forward to within 100 yards of the turnpike before bursting forth with a Rebel yell and pitching into the enemy. Causing what Ross termed “a perfect stampede” the Rebels captured thirty-nine wagons and chased off the terrified teamsters and guards who were not killed or captured. Mention was even made of the “continuous uproar of musketry” being heard back at Spring Hill. The Texans were unable to commandeer all of the wagons so Ross ordered a handful of them to be set afire, bathing the immediate area in an eerie glow.

For about thirty minutes the Confederates held possession of the turnpike but Ross’ tiny force was in no position to hold off the large numbers of Federal infantry moving up from the south. According to Ross not only did he see troops marching from Spring Hill but some of those who had previously passed to the north and were alerted to the chaos near Thompson’s Station must have doubled back because others were swooping in from the north. At once Ross ordered his troopers to retire and for the rest of the night the Texans “remained on the hills overlooking the pike until daylight, and saw the Yankee army in full retreat.”

For the Federal perspective General David Stanley wrote in his official report:

My staff officers were busily employed hurrying up the teamsters, and everything promised well, when we were again thrown into despair by the report that the train was attacked north of Thompson’s Station, and the whole train had stopped.

It was now 3 o’clock in the morning. General Kimball was directed to push on with the First Division and clear the road. General Wood’s division, which had deployed in the night north of Spring Hill and facing the east, had covered the road, was directed to move on, keeping off the road and on the right flank of the train, and General Wagner’s division, although wearied by the fighting of the day before, was detailed to bring up the rear. Before Kimball’s division could reach the point at which the train was attacked, Major Steele, of my staff, had gotten up a squad of our stragglers and driven off the rebels making the attack; they had succeeded in burning about ten wagons. The trains moved on again, and at about 5 o’clock I had the satisfaction of seeing the last wagon pass the small bridge. The entire corps was on the road before daylight.

Years after the war’s conclusion, writing for the Century Company magazine, Colonel Henry Stone, a member of General Thomas’ staff, wrote of the belief common among not only former Confederates but particularly Federal soldiers:

When night came, the danger increased rather than diminished. A single Confederate brigade, like Adams’ or Cockrell’s or Maney’s, veterans since Shiloh, planted squarely across the pike, either north or south of Spring Hill, would have effectually prevented Schofield’s retreat, and daylight would have found his whole force cut off from every avenue of escape by more than twice its numbers, to assault whom would have been madness, and to avoid whom would have been impossible.

General Thomas Wood, writing barely a month after Spring Hill, spoke for countless others when he said, “The effect of a night attack on a column en route would have been, beyond doubt, most disastrous.” Additionally General Luther Bradley, in a letter

Thomas John Wood

composed three weeks after Spring Hill, said - “It was the most critical time I have ever seen. If only the enemy had shown his usual boldness, I think he would have beaten us disastrously.” The one man whose opinion conflicted greatly with practically all others was John Schofield. In his memoirs, Forty-Six Years In The Army, Schofield almost casually reflects on how if the Columbia-Franklin turnpike had been captured by Hood’s men the Federal troops simply would have marched via a different route:

If the enemy had got possession of a point on the pike, the column from Duck River would have taken the country road a short distance to the west of Spring Hill and Thompson’s Station, and marched on to Franklin. The situation at Spring Hill in the night was not by any means a desperate one. Veteran troops are not so easily cut off in an open country.

Whether Schofield was actually so calm and determined on the 29th of November is a matter of open debate but David Stanley, it should be remembered, said that Schofield was ready to forfeit the entire wagon train in an effort to escape. There was apparently even talk of surrendering the entire Federal army. In addition no one else on either side ever mentioned this road to the west of Spring Hill as an avenue of escape. Also Schofield’s comment about veteran troops is somewhat misleading because a great many of the soldiers under his command were recruits and untested ones at that. Those are the very type of troops who can easily be frightened and routed. Stanley, who it must be said was no great supporter of Schofield, wrote in his memoirs that until late on the 29th the commanding general was unsure of just about everything and that Schofield's aforementioned claims in his own book were "the merest bosh." All things thus said Schofield's version of events appears weak at best.

The last Federal troops to reach Spring Hill were the two Kentucky regiments left behind by Cox to occupy the picket line at Columbia. Led by a lieutenant colonel these men, of whom more than a few expected to be gobbled up by the Rebels, arrived at around 4 a.m. as what remained of Schofield’s army was gearing up for the march to Franklin. At 5 a.m., while Stanley saw to it that the last supply wagon crossed the bridge north of town, Colonel Emerson Opdycke’s brigade of Wagner’s division, the only United States troops remaining in Spring Hill, received new orders. Opdycke’s men were designated as the army’s new rear guard and quickly the men moved into column. Among the first troops to arrive they were now the last to leave. Opdycke well understood that serving as the rear guard was replete with peril so he got his troops on the road and out of Spring Hill at once, knowing full well that every minute of separation between him and the Rebels would count. By the time the first streaks of twilight began shortly after 6 a.m. the Yankees were long gone. Spring Hill, although littered with army debris, was entirely empty. Sunrise was at 6:39 a.m. and the Confederate troops who awoke first must have been struck by the ominous silence. It was not to last long. A storm was already brewing.

So it was that the Union army escaped from Spring Hill and, it would seem, the very jaws of defeat. Exhausted, hungry, and cold the blue-clad troops stumbled toward Franklin, shaking their heads at how they had managed to slip past the enemy but nonetheless happy with the result. What no one in the miles long column could have possibly imagined was what lay ahead. Spring Hill had been just the beginning.